A generalized adversary decision algorithm and analytic solution methods for advise models by Ford, Michael
c© 2012 MICHAEL D. FORD
A GENERALIZED ADVERSARY DECISION ALGORITHM AND ANALYTIC
SOLUTION METHODS FOR ADVISE MODELS
BY
MICHAEL D. FORD
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Professor William H. Sanders
ABSTRACT
Quantitative security metrics are becoming increasingly important to system administra-
tors. ADVISE generates quantitative security metrics by combining a system vulnerability
graph with an adversary profile through an adversary decision algorithm. Previously, the
decision algorithm placed restrictive assumptions on the adversary profile, and simulation
was the sole solution method for ADVISE models. In this thesis, the decision algorithm is
generalized while simultaneously improving its performance by incorporating theory from
discrete-time Markov games. Furthermore, by exploring the state-space and generating the
transition probability matrix, numerical solution methods may be applied to solve ADVISE
models. Identifying key properties allows the models to be tested for compatibility with
alternative solution methods from the literature, enabling additional metrics for ADVISE
models. Finally, the performance of simulation is improved significantly by introducing de-
cision caching. Together these accomplishments expand the number of quantitative security
metrics and solution methods available to ADVISE models while lifting restrictions on the
adversary profile and improving performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Accessible quantitative security metrics are required to help system administrators accu-
rately assess the security of their systems. The ADVISE method has been shown to produce
insightful security metrics in [1] and [2]. We generalize the ADVISE adversary decision algo-
rithm while simultaneously introducing significant performance gains. With these additions,
ADVISE becomes applicable to a broad range of situations. By introducing the performance
gains, we can analyze large-scale systems and ADVISE can be incorporated into live anal-
ysis. With generalized analysis algorithms, ADVISE can generate complex metrics without
placing assumptions on attacker’s behavior.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores related work in depth, focusing on
graph-based vulnerability representations. In Chapter 3, we present the ADVISE formalism
and discuss important properties of the representation. We explore the adversary’s decision
algorithm in Chapter 4 by generalizing the decision process, presenting decision algorithms,
and discussing their performance implications. Chapter 5 discusses solution methods to
produce security metrics. We explore simulation, numerical techniques, property-specific
methods, and finally we compare their performance. We conclude with Chapter 6 and
highlight future work.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
The field of quantitative computer security grew out of the reliability field as the need for
quantitative security metrics rose. Thus, quantitative security models closely parallel their
reliability counterparts. Fault trees in the reliability field became attack trees in the security
field. Markov models and Petri nets have undergone numerous design iterations as they were
adapted for the security field. Even failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has found a
home in some security domains.
We examine both the work of pioneers and recent successes in the quantitative security
field while focusing largely on the use of graphs in the literature. Graphs are the natural
way to represent connectivity between components. In previous work, graph nodes have
represented single machines, specific privilege levels, or arbitrary security assets. Typically,
edges in the graph represent security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an attacker.
More complex schema have been developed over time as researchers recognized the fact
that complex interactions in state needed to be modeled. Additionally, graphs and modeling
environments have been extended in order to facilitate the computation of more complex
metrics. Attack graphs, multi-prerequisite graphs, and exploit dependency graphs are de-
scribed in the following sections.
2.1 Privilege Graphs
Dacier and Deswarte introduced privilege graphs in [3]. In a privilege graph, nodes repre-
sent privilege states, and weighted, directed edges represent attacks. Therefore, as in most
attack graphs, the privilege graph is a graph of state variables, not one which represents
the underlying state-space. The edge weights represent the time or effort an attacker must
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spend on the specific attack.
An attacker begins at a single node, and follows a path to their goal. The main metric
used to analyze a privilege graph is the mean effort to failure (MEFT). This metric satisfies
three main properties outlined by Dacier and Deswarte as critical metric properties:
1. Security increases if the “length of the paths” leading to the target
increases.
2. Security decreases if the “number of paths” leading to the target increases.
3. Security is mainly affected by the shortest path leading to the target.
In [4] and [5], privilege graphs are converted into Petri nets [6]. The underlying Markov
chain [7] can be extracted from a stochastic Petri net and used to generate the state graph.
Additionally, the Markov chain can also be used to compute metrics numerically. This
parallels the computation of mean time to failure (MTTF) in the reliability field.
In a privilege graph, all attacks are monotonic; that is, an attack never loses a privilege
level that they previously possessed. Additionally, each attack edge has a single enabling
privilege, and a single resulting privilege. Finally, there is a single attack goal in the entire
graph.
2.2 Multiple-Prerequisite Graphs
Often in networked systems, computers and other resources are grouped into subnetworks.
After gaining access to a subnetwork, an attacker may launch the same attack against any
other computer on the subnetwork. Lippmann et al. recognized the potential for a reduction
of the attack graph in [8]. Their realization was that access to the subnetwork, or the more
general “reachability group,” and not just access to the machine, is a critical security state
variable. Their new graph representation is the multiple-prerequisite (MP) graph.
Vulnerabilities in a typical attack graph are represented as edges, which implies using a
single state variable as the precondition and a single state variable as the outcome. Lippmann
et al. changed the structure of the attack graph by creating two new types of nodes: the
prerequisite node and the vulnerability instance node. A prerequisite node is enabled by any
3
of the state nodes connecting to it. The prerequisite node enables all vulnerability nodes it
connects to. The outcome of a vulnerability node is the single state node it connects to.
There are two ways to view MP graphs. The first is to consider both state nodes and
prerequisite nodes as state variables. In this instance, the vulnerability node has a single
prerequisite, and the outcome may affect several state variables. The second is to consider
prerequisite nodes as simple Boolean algebraic expressions that define the enabling conditions
for a vulnerability node. Then, the precondition for a vulnerability node is complex, however
the outcome affects a single state variable.
Regardless of this distinction, the MP graph can be seen as a reduction of the full graph,
which improves performance by reducing the number of vulnerabilities in the graph. In the
analysis of the MP graph, Lippmann et al. assume monotonicity. This assumption implies
that the order of attack steps does not impact the resulting state. Because the main analysis
performed on MP graphs is the percentage of hosts that may be compromised, the monotonic
assumption does not have any affect on analysis, only on performance.
2.3 Exploit Dependency Graphs
Noel et al. introduced the exploit dependency graph in [9]. The exploit dependency graph
is constructed from a set of exploits, and is then reduced to produce those attacks which
are sufficient and necessary in order to achieve the goals. The exploits are represented as a
Boolean precondition and monotonic postcondition.
The construction resembles a forward state space exploration, beginning with an initial
state and applying exploits to traverse into new states. Once the full dependency graph is
constructed, a backward reduction is performed, producing the attack paths that are both
sufficient and necessary to reach a goal in an exploit dependency graph.
The analysis of an exploit dependency graph is to produce the set of choices of which se-
curity countermeasures with the lowest total cost to deploy for network hardening. Analysis
requires a further backward traversal of the graph. Each goal’s preconditions are recursively
replaced with the disjunction of the preconditions of any exploit which results in the goal.
This results in a Boolean condition for accessing the goal in terms of the initial conditions.
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Finally, the set of hardening measures that satisfy the safety of the goals while minimizing
cost are suggested.
We have closely examined the most widely used formalisms for modeling vulnerabilities in
and attacks against a system. Each of those formalisms make limiting assumptions for ease
of analysis. These assumptions include the monotonicity of state-variables, the exponential
nature of attack time, single state-variable prerequisites, and single state-variable outcomes.
These assumptions place unnecessary restrictions on the types of analysis that can be com-
pleted. For instance, the monotonic assumption implies that an active defense cannot be
modeled. These assumptions, while important, should not be forced on the model. We
present a general attack graph where analysis methods may be applied depending on the
structure of the model.
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CHAPTER 3
ADVISE FORMALISM
In this chapter, we review the ADVISE formalism, which is defined in [1] and [2]. The attack
execution graph (AEG) is a state-based attack graph that represents system vulnerabilities
that an adversary may exploit. The adversary profile (AP) describes the attributes of an
adversary, and the adversary decision algorithm (ADA) selects the optimal attack step to
attempt from a given state. The ADA allows the attributes in the adversary’s profile to
produce emergent behavior. ADVISE combines the attack execution graph and the adversary
profile via the adversary decision algorithm in order to predict how an adversary attacks a
system.
In this chapter, we formally define the attack execution graph, present properties of the
attack execution graph, define the adversary profile, and define the optimal conditions for
the adversary decision algorithm.
3.1 The Attack Execution Graph
An attack execution graph is defined by the tuple
〈A,R,K, S,G〉,
where
A is the set of attack steps,
R is the set of system accesses,
K is the set of system knowledge,
S is the set of attack skills,
6
and G is the set of attack goals.
3.1.1 Notion of State
The sets R, K, and G are sets of Boolean state variables. S is a set of skill variables that
are statically defined for each adversary. Since an adversary’s evaluation of all skill variables
is static and known a priori, S is not included in the state. This evaluation is discussed
further in Section 3.3.
We define:
Γ = R
⋃
K
⋃
G as the set of state variables.
γ ∈ Γ as a state variable.
X = P(Γ) as the state-space, or the set of all possible states.
s ∈ X as a state. Therefore, s ⊆ Γ.
This representation of state relies on the assumption that all state variables in Γ are
Boolean. Therefore, the two values a state variable takes on are represented by the state
variable name being included in, true, or excluded from, false, the set that represents the
state of the model. This assumption is just for notational convience; it is simple to extend
the notion of state to a discrete set of values. We use this representation for its simplicity,
especially with respect to the attack graph properties in Section 3.2.
3.1.2 Attack Steps
An attack step ai ∈ A is defined by the tuple
ai = 〈Bi, Ti, Ci, Oi, P ri, Fi, Ei〉,
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where
Bi : X → {True, False} is the attack step Boolean precondition,
Ti : X × R+ → [0, 1] is the attack step time distribution,
Ci : X → R≥0 is the attack step cost,
Oi is the finite set of attack outcomes,
Pri : X ×Oi → [0, 1] is the outcome probability distribution,
Fi : X ×Oi → [0, 1] is the probability of non-detection for each outcome,
Ei : X ×Oi → X is the outcome-dependent state transition function.
3.2 Properties of an Attack Execution Graph
In this section, we list properties of an attack execution graph (AEG) that are commonly
used in the security metrics literature discussed in Chapter 2. The following properties are
often required in order for a specific type of analysis to be performed. These properties show
the modeling power of the AEG and allow us to identify which types of analysis can be used
with a specific AEG.
Exponential (in Time)
The timing distribution is exponential for all attack steps in the AEG.
If Ti(s) = λe
−λt, λ ∈ R+, ∀ai ∈ A, then the AEG is exponential in time.
Static
• Static with respect to Cost:
If, for attack step i, Ci(s) = c, ∀s ∈ X, then attack step i is static w.r.t. cost.
• Static with respect to Time:
If, for attack step i, Ti(s) = τ , ∀s ∈ X, then attack step i is static w.r.t. time.
• Static with respect to Outcome Probability:
If, for attack step i, Pri(s) = p, ∀s ∈ X, then attack step i is static w.r.t. outcome
probability.
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• Static with respect to Detection Probability:
If, for attack step i, Di(s) = d, ∀s ∈ X, then attack step i is static w.r.t. detection
probability.
• Static with respect to State Transition:
Let e+ , Ei(∅, o) and e− , Ei(Ω, o).
If, for attack step i, Ei(s, o) = s
′ and s′ \ s ⊆ e+ and s \ s′ ⊆ e−, ∀o ∈ Oi, ∀s ∈ S, then
attack step i is static w.r.t. state transition.
If all attack steps in the AEG are static with respect to cost, time, outcome probability,
and state transition, then the AEG is static.
Simple Enabling Conditions
An attack step’s enabling condition depends on a single state variable.
The AEG has simple enabling conditions if ∃ a state variable γ ∈ Γ
such that Bi(s) =
 True γ ∈ sFalse γ /∈ s .
Monotonic Enabling Conditions
An AEG has monotonic enabling conditions, if, when an attack step is enabled for a given
state, the addition of any state variables to that state may not disable the attack step.
Formally, if Bi(s) = True ⇒ Bi(s ∪ s′) = True, ∀s′ ∈ X, ∀ai ∈ A, then the AEG has
monotonic prerequisites.
Singular Outcomes
An AEG has singular outcomes, if, there is only a single outcome per attack step.
Formally, if |Oi| = 1 ∀ai ∈ A, then the AEG has singular outcomes.
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Simple Outcomes
An AEG has simple outcomes, if, any outcome transition from a give state affects only one
state variable.
Formally, if Ei is of the form Ei(s, o) =
 ss ∪ γ ∀o ∈ Oi, ∀s ∈ X, ∀ai ∈ A, then the AEG
has simple outcomes.
Monotonic Outcomes
An AEG has monotonic outcomes, if, for any state, a transition from that state may never
relinquishes a state variable. In effect, this means that once an adversary gains an access, a
piece of knowledge or a goal, they never lose it by attempting another attack step.
Formally, if s′ = Ei(s, o)⇒ s ⊆ s′, ∀o ∈ Oi, ∀s ∈ X, ∀ai ∈ A, then the AEG has monotonic
outcomes.
It is important to note that the properties listed above are restrictions placed on an attack
execution graph. Therefore, an attack execution graph is inherently not exponential, static,
monotonic, or simple. However, these properties apply to other representations, and the
analysis techniques used with those representations rely on assumptions that the properties
provide. The AEG properties enable one to compare the assumptions of various representa-
tions and identify which analysis techniques can be applied to a representation.
3.3 The Adversary Profile
The adversary profile is defined by the tuple
〈s0, L, P, wC , wP , wF , UC , UP , UF , N〉,
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where
s0 ∈ X is the initial model state,
L : S → [0, 1] is the attack skill level function,
P : X → R≥0 is the payoff value function,
wC , wP , wF ∈ [0, 1] are the attack preference weights,
UC : R≥0 → [0, 1] is the cost utility function,
UP : R≥0 → [0, 1] is the payoff utility function,
UF : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is the non-detection utility functions,
N ∈ N is the adversary’s planning horizon.
Each adversary may begin with a unique initial state, s0. The attack skill level function,
L, translates skill variables in an AEG into adversary specific values. The value of a state to
the adversary is given by the payoff value function, P . The utility functions UC , UP , and UF
convert the cost, payoff, and non-detection probability of an attack path into units of utility
for the adversary. These utility values are weighted by the corresponding preference weights
(wC , wP , and wF ) and then summed to create a measure of attractiveness of an attack path
to the adversary. Finally, the adversary can plan N attack steps into the future.
The attack execution graph is a rich modeling formalism for describing the vulnerabilities
in a system. We have identified key properties of the AEG that help us relate an AEG to
other representations. Finally, the adversary profile provides a descriptive environment to
model adversaries. The next chapter will explore the interaction between the adversary
profile and the attack execution graph.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ADVERSARY DECISION ALGORITHM
The adversary decision is the way in which the adversary profile combines with the attack
execution graph to produce security metrics. In a given state, the adversary selects an attack
step to attempt, the attack step’s outcome is selected probabilistically, and the state changes
based on the outcome effects. Then the cycle repeats.
The Adversary Decision Algorithm (ADA), or β(s), dictates the way in which the adver-
sary profile values deterministically influence the attack step selection. A specific recursive
decision algorithm is presented in [1] and [2]. In this chapter, we introduce a generalization
of the adversary decision algorithm, define an optimality condition, present specific decision
algorithms, optimize them, and analyze their performance.
4.1 Generalizing the Attack Step Selection
The attack step selection explores the future state space and determines which attack step
provides the optimal future based on their specific weights and utility functions in the ad-
versary profile. This future value is called the attractiveness. Here, we present a formal
framework for defining the optimal attack step for an adversary to attempt in a given state.
4.1.1 Exploring the Future
The adversary’s decision is similar to one made in a stochastic game. Since a Markov perfect
equilibrium exists in a stochastic game [10], it is possible to find the optimal adversary
decision for an ADVISE model. Therefore we borrow the concepts of event histories and
decision policies from the field of game theory.
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The term ht denotes a history looking t steps into the future:
ht = 〈s0, a0, o0, s1, . . . , st−1, at−1, ot−1, st〉.
A single history consists of a sequence of states s0, . . . , st ∈ X such that a state si transitions
to si+1 based on the effects of oi ∈ Oai for 0 ≤ i < t, or more formally, si+1 = E(si, oi),
oi ∈ Oai . We use the notation si ai,oi−→ si+1 for compactness. Figure 4.1(a) depicts a single
history ht within the set of all possible histories extending from the initial state.
(a) ht: A Single Path
(b) Ht: The Set of All Possible Paths
(c) Htσ: The Set of Possible Paths Given a Policy
Figure 4.1: History Trees
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Let H t(〈s0〉) denote the set of all possible histories ht, with look-ahead t, that begin with
state s0. We extend this definition recursively as follows:
H t(Hs) =

Hs t = s
{ht−1 ⊕ 〈a, o, Ea(st−1, o)〉 s.t. t > s
ht−1 = (s0, . . . , st−1) ∈ H t−1(Hs)
a ∈ A : Ba(st−1) = true, and o ∈ Oa},
where the symbol ⊕ represents the append operator that appends a new step, outcome, and
state to a history, i.e., 〈s0, a0, o0, s1, . . . , st−1, at−1, ot−1, st〉⊕〈at, ot, st+1〉 = 〈s0, a0, o0, . . . , at, ot, st+1〉.
Figure 4.1(b) depicts the set of all possible histories H t within the state space of depth
t. In this figure, from the initial state, the adversary selects one of two attack steps, each
of which will result in either of two possible outcomes. From those resulting states, the
adversary may select from three attack steps, again with two possible outcomes each.
Notice that ht is a single path through the state space, while H t represents the entire set
of paths through the state space of depth t. A history ht is the path an adversary could take
if both attack steps and outcomes were fixed. H t is the set of paths an adversary could take
if neither the attack steps nor outcomes were fixed. What remains is to depict the potential
paths of an adversary given the deterministic choice of the best attack step with respect to
state and the non-deterministic nature of attack step outcomes.
Therefore, a policy σ is defined to be a mapping at each look-ahead level from a state to
an attack step, and σt is defined to be a policy with a look-ahead of t. Then σt = (f1, . . . , ft),
where fk : X → A, i.e., fk(s) = a means that attack a is chosen in step k. The set of all
policies with look-ahead t is Ωt, and Ωtai is the set of policies with look-ahead t and attack
step ai as the first attack step. Note that set Ω
t
ai
is empty in state s if Bi(s) = false. A
policy-consistent history, htσ, is a history such that ∀k, fk(sk) = ak. That is, the history
follows the attack steps prescribed by the policy.
Then, the set of all policy-consistent histories, denoted by H tσ(〈s〉), is the set of all pos-
sible sample paths through the state space starting with state s, given that the adversary
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follows the policy σ for selecting attack steps and only the outcomes are stochastic. See
Figure 4.1(c).
4.1.2 Policy Attractiveness
With those notations, we can extend the notation for reward values that are required for the
computation of the attractiveness. In particular, let
CCn(Hn(〈s〉)) =
∑
hn∈Hn
(
n−1∑
i=0
Cai(si)×
n−1∏
i=0
Prai(si, oi)
)
PP n(Hn(〈s〉)) =
∑
hn∈Hn
(
n−1∑
i=0
Gai(si, oi)×
n−1∏
i=0
Prai(si, oi)
)
FF n(Hn(〈s〉)) =
∑
hn∈Hn
(
n−1∏
i=0
Fai(si, oi)×
n−1∏
i=0
Prai(si, oi)
)
.
The values are the cumulative cost (CCn), gain (PP n), and probability that the attack is not
detected (FF n) over all possible histories of length n. To help understand these formulae,
we describe how the cumulative cost is computed. First, the sum of the costs for all of the
attack steps in a single history is computed. Then this sum is weighted by the probability
of that history, that is by the product of the probabilities for each outcome in the history.
The sum of the probabilistically weighted cost of each history is the cumulative cost for the
policy.
With those values, the attractiveness of a policy σ is given by converting the cumulative
cost, payoff, and probability of nondetection to a common unit of adversary utility and
weighting the values by the adversary’s preference weights:
at(Hnσ (〈s〉)) = wCUC(CCn(Hnσ (〈s〉))) + wPUP (PP n(Hnσ (〈s〉)))
+wFUF (FF
n(Hnσ (〈s〉))) (4.1)
Then, the attractiveness of an attack step, ai, is the maximum of all policy attractivenesses
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where the policy dictates that ai be attempted from state s:
attrn(s, ai) = max
σ∈Ωnai
(at(Hnσ (〈s〉))) . (4.2)
Observe that the functions U(.) in (Eq. 4.1) can be arbitrary non-linear functions. Function
β is defined for a look-ahead of N as
β(s) = argmax
ai∈A
(
attrN(s, ai)
)
. (4.3)
Therefore, β(s) gives the attack step that results in the most attractive future based on the
adversary’s utility of the cumulative cost, gain, and probability of non-detection.
In general, as already noted in [2, Theorem 3.2], the computation of β(s) requires the
computation of at(s, .) for all policies of length N , which means that for each of the (S ·A)
policies, |A||O|N−1 paths have to be considered. That becomes impractical for larger values
of N . Therefore, we consider cases where the computation over all paths can be avoided. Of
course, that implicitly or explicitly puts some restrictions on the functions U(.). However,
restrictions, such as monotonically increasing utility functions, seem to be natural.
4.1.3 Defining an Optimality Ordering
In order to reduce the computational complexity of β(s), we define an ordering on the
cumulative cost, payoff, and probability of nondetection values. This ordering enables the
direct comparison of two policies at intermediate locations in the β(s) computation. If
one policy sufficiently outperforms a second policy, the second policy can be ingored in the
remainder of the β(s) computation.
The attractiveness of using the policy σ in state s is characterized by three values: c =
CCn(Hnσ (〈s〉)), p = PP n(Hnσ (〈s〉)), and d = FF n(Hnσ (〈s〉)). We define an order  on the
triples (c, p, d).
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To formally define (c, p, d) (c′, p′, d′), let σt1, σt2 ∈ ASt such that:
(c, p, d) =
(
CCn(Hnσt1(〈s〉)), PP
n(Hnσt1(〈s〉)), FF
n(Hnσt1(〈s〉))
)
(c′, p′, d′) =
(
CCn(Hnσt2(〈s〉)), PP
n(Hnσt2(〈s〉)), FF
n(Hnσt2(〈s〉))
)
We use the notation (c, p, d)n (c′, p′, g′), n > t if:
at
(
H l+t
σlσt1
(s)
)
≥ at
(
H l+t
σlσts
(s)
)
∀l ∈ {1, . . . , n− t}, ∀σl ∈ Ωl, and ∀s ∈ X.
The notation (c, p, d) (c′, p′, d′) is used if (c, p, d) n (c′, p′, d′) ∀n ∈ N+.
Usually, the adversary’s utility functions U(.)(.) are of such a form that (c, p, d) (c′, p′, d′)
holds if c ≤ c′, p ≥ p′, and d ≥ d′, i.e., the costs are smaller and the gain and the probability
of not being detected are higher. However, there may be other cases, depending on the
definition of the utility functions.
Specifically, we consider the Markov decision process case (MDP-case), where an adver-
sary’s decisions are independent of the past. Markov decision processes are discussed in
general in [11], while their impact on the adversary decision is discussed in [2]. For this case,
the adversary decision function, βn(s), can be defined recursively. Then,
β1(s) = argmax
ai∈A
(wCUC(Ci(s)) + wPUP (Pi(s)) + wFUF (Fi(s)))
with C1∗(s) = Cβ1(s)(s), P
1
∗ (s) = Pβ1(s)(s), and D
1
∗(s) = Dβ1(s)(s). That makes it possible
to recursively compute Cn∗ (s), P
n
∗ (s), D
n
∗ (s) as well as β
n(s) (see [2, Eq. (3.8)-(3.12)]. Let
v = wCUC(c) + wPUP (p) + wFUF (d) and v
′ = wCUC(c′) + wPUP (p′) + wFUF (d′).
Then in the MDP-case, the relation  is defined as follows:
v > v′ ⇔ (c, p, d) (c′, p′, d′).
Furthermore, if the two values are identical, we define
v = v′ ⇔ (c, p, d) ≈ (c′, p′, d′),
and in this case, it does not matter whether we choose (c, p, d) or (c′, p′, d′). Consequently,
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in the MDP-case  and ≈ define a total order, i.e., two values (c, p, d) and (c′, p′, d′) are in
relation  or in relation  or in relation ≈. Below, we use the notation (c, p, d)(c′, p′, d′)
for (c, p, d)  (c′, p′, d′) or (c, p, d) ≈ (c′, p′, d′) and use this relation in Algorithm 3 in the
next section for evaluating function β(s).
4.2 Computation of the Adversary Decision Algorithm
In the most general case, the function β() must evaluate all policies from ΩN , and therefore,
all histories HNσ , σ ∈ ΩN . This can be done using Algorithm 1, in which • denotes the
undefined value.
Algorithm 1 Simple β(s) Computation
1: β = • and best val = −∞;
2: for all σ ∈ ΩN do
3: determine val = at(Hnσ (〈s〉) using (4.1);
4: if val > best val then
5: best val = val;
6: β = i1;
7: return β;
Algorithm 1 is rather naive and may compute values recursively several times. If the
relation  is available, a graph-based approach that can exploit the relation is much more
efficient. In that case, successor states up to N steps apart are explored and an acyclic multi-
graph is generated. This alternative algorithm for determining β(s) consists of a forward
and a backward phase as given in Algorithm 2 and 3 respectively. In the forward phase, all
states are generated that can be reached in 1, 2, . . . , N steps (Lines 4-7), and they are stored
in sets Yn (Line 8). Furthermore, all transitions s (ai,o)→ s′ with s ∈ Yn and s′ ∈ Yn+1 are
stored with the source states to be used in the subsequent backward phase (Line 9). Since
several transitions can exist between two states s and s′, the graph is a multigraph.
In the subsequent backward phase, the values are evaluated bottom-up in the multigraph.
Since the valuation is computed bottom-up, we store a set of valuations V with each state-
level pair 〈s, n〉 in the form (s, n).V . A valuation is of the form (c, p, d), with the same
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Algorithm 2 Forward β(s) Computation
1: Y0 = {s0};
2: for n = 1 to N do
3: Yn = ∅;
4: for all s ∈ Yn−1 do
5: for all ai ∈ A with Bi(s) = true do
6: for all o ∈ Oi do
7: let s′ = Ei(s, o);
8: Yn = Yn ∪ {s′};
9: add an edge between s and s′ labeled with (ai, o) to state s;
10: return Y0, . . . ,YN ;
meaning described above. For the states s ∈ YN , (s,N).V = {(0, 0, 1)} is used for initializa-
tion; the other values are computed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Backward β(s) Computation
1: β = • and best val = −∞;
2: for n = N − 1 downto 0 do
3: for all s ∈ Yn do
4: for all ai ∈ A with Bi(s) = true do
5: for all combinations (c′, p′, d′) ∈ (s′, n+ 1).V where s (ai,o)−→ s′ do
6: c = Ci(s) +
∑
o∈Oi Pri(s, o)c
′;
7: p =
∑
o∈Oi Pri(s, o)(Gi(s, o, s
′) + g′);
8: d =
∑
o∈Oi Pri(s, o)(Fi(s, o)d
′);
9: if n = 0 then
10: val = wCUC(c) + wPUP (p) + wFUF (d);
11: if val > best val then
12: best val = val;
13: β = ai;
14: else if no (c, p, d)′ ∈ (s, n).V with (c, p, d)′(c, p, d) exists then
15: (s, n).V = (s, n).V ∪ {(c, p, d)};
16: remove all (c, p, d)′ from (s, n).V with (c, p, d)(c, p, d)′;
17: return β;
Step 5, in which all combinations of possible valuations in successor states have to be
evaluated, is crucial. Since Oi usually has two outcomes, success or failure, the number of
possible valuations grows with the product of the valuations in the successor states. In the
worst case, the number of valuations in the algorithm equals N · |A|N , as for Algorithm 1.
However, if states contain identical successor states or can be used to reduce the number of
valuations, then the effort is reduced. In the MDP-case, we only need to store one valuation
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per state, which implies that the effort equals the number of edges in the graph defined by
Y0, . . . ,YN .
A further improvement can be achieved if results are reused in consecutive β(s) calcula-
tions. We store the values of (s, n).V between β(s) calculations. If, in a subsequent forward
phase, state s ∈ Yn is generated, (s, n).V can be used directly, and no successors of s need
to be generated, since the evaluation for the backward phase is already available. Therefore,
the condition if |(s, n).V| > 0 then may be inserted into Algorithm 2 at line 5, surround-
ing the inner two for loops and stopping further exploration of the path if the valuation is
available. That reuse of results should improve runtimes significantly for most models. If
memory becomes a problem, only values from the upper levels of Yn (where n is small) are
stored, since their reuse introduces the largest benefits.
In [2], the adversary decision algorithm is a depth-first search of the state space in N steps.
The ADA does not utalize caching, so parts of the state space may be explored repeatedly.
Additionally, in order for the ADA in [2] to generate the optimal attack step, the adversary’s
utility functions must follow a specified form. This form allows for the recursive combination
of the cost, detection, and payoff to satisfy Bellman’s Equation.
4.3 Performance of the Adversary Decision Algorithm
The time to complete the adversary decision algorithm corresponds directly to the number
of states that are explored. For typical models, the complexity can be hard to compute since
the number of enabled attacks is not known a priori. However, for a general model in which
all attack steps are enabled, and each attack step has a fixed number of outcomes, O, the
recursive algorithm in [2] visits |A||O|N states and is therefore exponential in the look-ahead.
4.3.1 Algorithm Comparison
The simplest method of executing the adversary decision algorithm is to use the depth-
first, recursive approach. That method leads to |A||O|N states being explored, as mentioned
above. An improvement is to use a graph-based approach of Algorithms 2 and 3, caching
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intermediate valuations and reusing them if the same state is encountered again at the
same look-ahead level. A comparison of the depth-first exploration and the graph-based
exploration are presented in Figure 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) respectively.
In practice, we cache the cost, detection probability, and expected payoff of the sub-
graph for each state and look-ahead level pair rather than construct the entire graph and
iterate over it. This is the caching extension to Algorithms 2 and 3 outlined in the previous
section. The nature of Algorithms 2 and 3, as well as the addition of the caching technique,
significantly reduce the branching of the decision algorithm.
Because all intermediate values are cached, the number of states explored is bounded by
the look-ahead times the size of the state space (N ∗ 2|A||K||G|). That can still be very large;
however, because of the sequential nature of attacks, in typical models, the reachable state
space is significantly smaller than the potential state space.
4.3.2 Performance Data
In Table 4.1, we present full execution timings for the base implementation of the recursive
algorithm and when caching was used within Algorithms 2 and 3 with caching. Those
timings are generated from an easily extensible model.
The model consists of eight accesses, eight attack steps, and seven goals. One access is
designated as the initial access. Then, seven of the attack steps are set up in order, so
that they can only be performed sequentially. The eighth attack step is always enabled.
Additionally, each attack step has two outcomes, success and failure. The structure of the
model provides the exact number of states exlpored in the decision algorithm, since two
attack steps are always enabled, and each attack step has two outcomes. The number of
states explored is 4N , where N is the look-ahead.
The recursive algorithm scales poorly with respect to the look-ahead since it is exponential.
By caching within the algorithm, essentially converting the tree to a graph, we achieve
significant improvements. Most notably, the caching algorithm scales linearly with respect
to the look-ahead.
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Table 4.1: Simulation Timing (in seconds)
Recursive Caching in
Look-ahead Algorithm Algorithms 2 & 3
1 0.87 1.12
2 1.71 2.59
3 4.79 5.23
4 17.80 8.96
5 69.12 13.89
6 289.81 19.78
7 1134.02 26.99
8 4303.11 34.63
9 18455.96 42.50
Applying theory from stochastic games in order to allow the adversary utility functions to
take on general forms and using a forward-backward algorithm augmented with caching to
improve performance are both significant accomplishments. However, without the optimality
ordering, there would be no way to combine the two. While the ordering does place some
restrictions on the adversary utility functions, they are not as strict as the previous optimality
requirements. By using the optimality ordering within the forward-backward algorithm
with caching, performance is significantly improved while placing as few restrictions on the
adversary profile as possible.
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CHAPTER 5
SOLUTION METHODS
In this chapter, we identify solution methods to produce quantitative security metrics from
the combination of the attack execution graph and the adversary profile.
5.1 State-Space and Transition Matrix Generation
Exploring the reachable state-space offers an alternative to the on-the-fly adversary decision
and attack step outcome used during simulation. It also enables the creation of the transition
matrix, which is required for the numerical solution methods presented in Section 5.3. In this
section, we present the algorithm used for state-space generation and discuss the generation
of the transition matrix.
5.1.1 State-Space Generation
Let Xˆ be the potential state space that contains all combinations of values of the Boolean
state variables and, consequently, has a cardinality of 2|R|·|K|·|G|. In ADVISE models, the
potential state space may be too large to be enumerated; however, for typical models, the
reachable state space X usually only contains a small subset of the states.
For the basic state-space generation algorithm, we use a data structure U to store state
descriptions and a data structure X to store state description plus the adversary decision
β(s). Then, Algorithm 4 presents a generic algorithm for state-space generation.
For finite state spaces, the algorithm terminates after computing the set of states and
the index of the attack step to be performed in the state. That information is sufficient to
characterize the complete stochastic process.
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Algorithm 4 State Space Generation
1: U = {s0};
2: while U 6= ∅ do
3: remove s from U ;
4: ai = determine beta(s);
5: for all o ∈ Oi do
6: s′ = Ei(s, o);
7: if s′ /∈ X ∪ U ∪ {s} then
8: U = U ∪ {s′};
9: X = X ∪ {(s, ai)};
5.1.2 Transition Matrix Generation
After the state-space generation, X contains the selected attack steps together with the
transitions. Therefore, it contains all information necessary for the analysis steps. Let m
be the cardinality of the state space. We describe the underlying stochastic process now in
terms of vectors and matrices. The dimension of the vector is 1×m or m× 1, and the order
of the matrices is m×m.
Let P be the transition matrix of the embedded discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) that
considers the state of the system when an attack steps ends. We have
P(s, s′) =
∑
o∈Oβ(s)
δ(Eβ(s)(s, o) = s
′)Prβ(s)(s, o) s.t. δ(b) =
 1 b = true0 b = false
Since P is usually not irreducible, the state space may be analyzed and reordered before
the matrix is generated. The analysis is done using an algorithm, such as Tarjan’s algorithm
[12], to detect strongly connected components in the graph. Then X can be decomposed into
X0, which is the set of transient states, and X1, . . . , XL, which are L absorbing, irreducible
subsets. As long as X0 is nonempty, we may generate P according to this decomposition.
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In doing so, we obtain the following structure:
P =

P0,0 P0,1 · · · · · · P0,L
0 P1,1 0 · · · 0
... 0 P2,2 0
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 PL,L

.
P0,0 is a sub-stochastic matrix for the subset X0, and
N0,0 = (I−P0,0)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(P0,0)
k
exists and is nonnegative [7]. Moreover, N0,0(s, s
′) equals the mean number of visits to state
s′ before the set of transient states, X0, is left if the current state is s. s0 belongs to X0, and
we can assume that it is the first state in the set. Often P0,0 has an additional structure such
that N0,0 will not become a full matrix. However, this point will not be considered here.
Using standard arguments from absorbing Markov chains [7], we find that the probability
of entering subset Xl from the initial state equals
pel = e1N0,0P0,l I1 = n1∗P0,l I1,
where I1 is a column vector of 1 of appropriate length. Since we have a unique initial state s0,
only the first row of matrix N is required which results from the solution of n1∗(I−P0,0) = e1.
If X0 is empty, then the set of states is irreducible, and we can use matrix P as it is; we
assume that s0 is the first state. Thus, the initial vector is defined as e1, which is a row
vector in which the first element is 1 and all remaining elements are 0.
5.2 Simulation
The first method of analysis is simulation. Inherently, simulation explores a single path that
an adversary may take while attacking the system. The results of the single run are aggre-
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gated over thousands of runs, so that the resulting mean result has statistical significance.
There are two methods for supplying the simulation loop with the adversary decision and
attack step outcome. The first method is to generate the values as needed. That is, for each
loop of the simulation, the adversary’s decision is recalculated, and an attack step outcome
is selected probabilistically. The second option is to generate the state transition matrix as
detailed in the previous section (Sec. 5.1), and use it to drive the simulation.
The on-the-fly approach may be used if the state-space is extremely large, and the transi-
tion matrix can not be generated due to memory limitations. There are methods to reduce
the number of adversary decision computations performed over the course of all of the simu-
lation runs. This will be discussed in detail in Section 5.6. Additionally, once the transition
matrix is generated, many metrics may be produced directly, as detailed in the following
section.
5.2.1 Simulation with As-Needed Adversary Decision Computations
A typical simulation loop consists of identifying enabled transitions, selecting one probabilis-
tically, and changing model state. An example ADVISE simulation algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 5. By including the adversary decision in the simulation loop (Line 6), we
require an optimization problem to be solved for each state transition. The inclusion of the
adversary decision poses a significant performance hurdle.
Algorithm 5 Simple As-Needed Simulation
1: r = 0;
2: while r < MaxRuns do
3: s = s0;
4: t = 0;
5: while t < τ do
6: ai = β(s);
7: o = O, O ∼ Pri(s);
8: t = t+ T , T ∼ Ti(s);
9: s = Ei(s, o);
The exponential adversary decision algorithm is executed for each state the adversary en-
ters, over many simulation iterations. However, the adversary’s decision is static with respect
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to the state. By caching the decision associated with a state, as presented in Algorithm 6,
we avoid subsequent state-space exploration, and the complexity of the decision algorithm
is reduced from exploring attack paths to a simple lookup. The cache quickly returns the
adversary’s decision if the adversary revisits a state.
Algorithm 6 As-Needed Simulation with Caching
1: r = 0;
2: Q(s) = • ∀s ∈ X;
3: while r < MaxRuns do
4: s = s0;
5: t = 0;
6: while t < τ do
7: if Q(s) = • then
8: Q(s) = β(s);
9: ai = Q(s);
10: o = O, O ∼ Pri(s);
11: t = t+ T , T ∼ Ti(s);
12: s = Ei(s, o);
13: r = r + 1;
In addition, the cache can be used for more than a single simulation iteration. In order
to return accurate metrics within a specified confidence interval, a given experiment is run
many times. Since nothing in the underlying model changes between iterations, we can
continue to use the cache. Depending on the model, we can achieve a very high cache hit
rate after the first few simulation iterations, since only the attack outcomes are probabilistic.
The performance implications are discussed further in Section 5.6.
5.2.2 Simulation with the Transition Matrix
Using the transition matrix within the simulation loop to determine state transitions ensures
that the adversary decision must never be computed during any simulation run. However,
there are drawbacks. In the case of extremely rare events, states resulting from rare events
are explored in the state-space exploration and are therefore present in the transition matrix
despite their low probability of appearing during simulation. Since the accuracy of the
metrics is limited by the number of simulation runs, and the probabilistic nature of sampling
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the attack step outcomes, the extra time to compute the adversary’s decision for a rare state
is wasted computation.
Reusing the transition matrix is the most efficient when simulation is not the only analysis
method being performed. There are metrics that dictate the use of other solution methods.
In the following section, we identify other numerical metrics that can be computed directly
from the transition matrix.
5.3 Numerical Solutions
In this section, we explore the use of numerical solution methods after generating the tran-
sition matrix. These metrics are formed by direct manipulation of the transition matrix.
We begin with infinite horizon metrics, highlighting both state-based and attack-specific
metrics, then we present various types of transient solution methods.
5.3.1 State-Based Metrics
Several example metrics have been defined in [2, Chapter 4.5]. We show some metrics that
can be computed using analytical techniques that work on the state space. We also define
several new metrics, which provide fresh insight.
The first class of metrics considers the adversary who achieves a goal or a set of goals.
These measures can be defined for states. Thus, the state space can be decomposed into
three subsets. Xa is the set of states in which the adversary has already achieved his or her
goal. Xm is the subset in which the adversary may achieve his or her goal in the future. I.e.,
there exists a path from each state in Xm to a state in Xa. Finally, Xn is the set of states
from which the adversary will never achieve his or her goal. I.e., from a state in Xn, no state
in Xa is reachable.
The three subsets can be computed with an extended algorithm for reachability analysis
using the directed graph defined by matrix P. Initially Xa contains all states where the
adversary already achieved his or her goal. All states s ∈ X that are not connected to any
s′ ∈ Xa are collected in Xn. Then all states s ∈ X \ {Xa ∪Xn} without a connection to a
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state s′′ ∈ Xn are added to Xa since from those states the adversary will eventually reach
the goal. Xm consists of the remaining states that are neither in Xa nor in Xn.
If the initial state belongs to Xa or Xn, analysis is not necessary. In the former case,
the probability of reaching the required goals is 1, and the latter case, it is 0. To compute
the probability if s0 belongs to Xm, we make states in the sets Xa and Xn absorbing by
removing all outgoing transitions and setting the probability of remaining in the state to 1.
If we reorder the states according to the sets, P looks as follows:
P =

Pm,m Pm,a Pm,n
0 I 0
0 0 I
 .
The success probability corresponds to the absorption probability of the process in Xa, which
equals
psucc = e1
∞∑
k=0
(Pm,m)
kPm,a I1 = e1(I−Pm,m)−1Pm,a I1.
Since all states in Xm are connected to states in Xa, the above inverse matrix exists. Again,
e1(I−Pm,m)−1 can be determined by solving a set of linear equations of order |Xm|.
Let Nm,m = (I−Pm,m)−1. Then Nm,m(s, s′) is the mean number of visits to state s′ before
a state from Xa ∪Xn is reached, under the condition that the current state is s ∈ Xm. To
integrate timing information, we define a row vector t with t(s) = E[Tβ(s)(s)]. Consequently,
M(s, s′) = Nm,m(s, s′) · t(s′) is the mean time spent in state s′ and tabs = e1M I1 is the mean
time to absorption. tabs is the mean time before the goal is achieved or it becomes clear that
it will not be achieved.
Time
To compute the time under the condition that the goal is eventually achieved, we have to
consider the conditional absorbing Markov chain (see [13]). Let pm,a = Pm,a I1 and define
u = (I−Pm,m)−1pm,a.
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Then, u contains no 0 elements, since we have assumed that from every state in Xm a state
in Xa is reachable. Define U = diag(u), P
C
m,m = U
−1Pm,mU, and pCm,a = U
−1pCm,a. Matrix
PCm,a and vector p
C
m,a describe a new absorbing Markov chain with
NCm,m = (I−PCm,m)−1 = U−1Nm,mU
such that NCm,m(s, s
′) contains the main number of visits to state s′ under the condition
that the current state is s and absorption occurs in a state from Xa. Consequently, we can
use NCm,m rather than Nm,m to compute the mean time to a successful attack by defining
MC(s, s′) = NCm,m(s, s
′) · t(s′) and tabsa = e1MC I1 as the mean time of a successful attack
under the condition that the attack is successful.
Cost
The computation of cost-related measures is similar to the computation of mean times.
Thus, define
C(s, s′) = Nm,m(s, s′)Cβ(s)(s).
Then cabs = e1C I1 is the average cost before absorption, i.e., before the goal states have been
reached or become unreachable. The costs of a successful attack are cabsa = e1C
C I1, where
CC is built like C using NCm,m rather than Nm,m.
Gain
Computation of the gain is again similar; the only difference arises from the gain’s association
with transitions rather than states. Thus, define
gm(s) =
∑
s′∈Xm
∑
(i,o):ai=β(s)∧s i,o−→ s′
Pri(s, o)Gi(s, o, s
′)
 .
Then ∑
s′∈Xm
Nm,m(s0, s
′)gm(s′)
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is the average gain due to attack steps that do not leave Xm. To compute the average gain
until a state outside Xm is reached, the gain of the transition that leaves Xm must also be
considered. The probability of leaving Xm from state s ∈ Xm such that s′ ∈ Xa ∪Xn equals
Nm,m(s0, s)P(s, s
′). That implies that we obtain gabs for the average gain until a state in
Xn ∪Xa is reached.
g′m(s
′) =
∑
s′′∈Xa∪Xn
∑
(i,o):ai=β(s′)∧s′ i,o−→ s′′
Pri(s
′, o)Gi(s′, o, s′′)

gabs =
∑
s′∈Xm
Nm,m(s0, s
′) (gm(s′) + g′m(s
′))
Again, the conditional gain if a state from Xa is entered can be computed using N
C
m,m in
the previous equations.
Detection
For the computation of the probability that an attack step is not detected, let F be an m×m
matrix defined as follows:
F(s, s′) =
∑
(i,o):ai=β(s)∧s i,o−→ s′
Pri(s, o)Fi(s, o).
Matrix F includes the probabilities that an attack step is performed and not detected. F
can be decomposed like P, and since F(s, s′) ≤ P(s, s′), the inverse matrix (I − Fm,m)−1
exists and
pndet = e1(I− Fm,m)−1Pm,a I1
is the probability that the adversary reaches a state in Xa without being detected.
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5.3.2 Attack-Specific Metrics
Another class of metrics is related to the occurrence of specific attack steps or outcomes of
attack steps in a sequence of attacks. To determine these measures, we use the matrices P{i}
and P¬{i}.
Matrix P does not distinguish between different attack steps. To introduce such a dis-
tinction, we define P{i} as the matrix containing only transition probabilities according to
ai ∈ A.
P =
∑
ai∈A
P{i}.
Define P¬{i} = P − P{i} and p{i} = P{i} I1. Of course, P{i} and P¬{i} are structured like
P, but some of the non-zero sub-matrices in P may be zero in P{i} or P¬{i}. The notation
can be extended to sets of attack steps or pairs of attack steps and outcomes. E.g., P{(i,o),j}
captures all transitions according to attack step i with outcome o and attack step j with an
arbitrary outcome.
We overload notation slightly; from here on, we use P{i} for probabilities related to specific
attack steps as well as attack step outcome pairs, where the index (i, o) would be more
appropriate. If the state is irreducible and P{i} 6= 0, then the probability of performing
attack step i is 1. Otherwise, the probability of performing attack step i in a transient state
equals pai0 = 1− e1(I−P¬{i}0,0 )−1
∑L
l=1 P
¬{i}
0,l I1, and the probability of performing attack step
i in Xl (l = 1, . . . , L) under the condition that it has not been performed in a state from
X0 equals 0 if P
{i}
l,l = 0 and equals pa
i
0 = e1(I − P¬{i}0,0 )−1P¬{i}0,l I1 otherwise, such that the
probability of performing attack step i is given by pai =
∑L
l=0 pa
i
l. The computations can be
extended to sequences of attack steps and attack step outcome pairs. E.g., the probability
of performing attack step i before j is given by
e1
∞∑
k=0
(P¬{i,j})kP{i}
∞∑
k=0
(P¬{j})kP{j} I1.
If all states in matrices P¬{i,j} or P¬{j} are transient, then the infinite matrix sums can be
replaced by the inverse matrices (I−P¬{i,j})−1 and (I−P¬{j})−1 if appropriate.
33
In stationary analysis, one must compute the stationary distribution inside each irreducible
subset; it is then multiplied by the probability of reaching the subset from the initial state,
i.e., by probability pel. The embedded stationary distribution of the states in subset l is
given by the solution of
pl = plPl,l and pl I1 = pel.
The embedded stationary distribution does not consider the different sojourn times due to
different values for T (s). The stationary vector can be achieved by normalizing the values
of the embedded stationary distribution according to the sojourn times for the states in the
irreducible subset. The components of the stationary vector pi are computed as
pil(s) =
pl(s)t(s)∑
s′∈Xl pl(s
′)t(s′)
.
The frequency of attack step i is then given by
fi =
L∑
l=1
∑
s∈Xl
pil(s)
∑
s′∈Xl P
{i}(s, s′)
T (s)
.
5.3.3 Types of Transient Analysis
The metrics computed up to now are all related to an infinite time horizon on which the
time might be stopped when a specific condition is observed, i.e., a state has been reached
or an attack has occurred. The situation is more complex if the system should be analyzed
for a finite time horizon τ . In that case, transient analysis has to be performed. We briefly
consider five different approaches, all of which have specific advantages and disadvantages.
First, if P can be reordered to an upper triangular matrix, then the system is completely
acyclic. In that case, the behavior of the system is described by a finite set of paths, and
a path-based analysis can be performed. Each path starts in the initial state s0 and ends
after finitely many steps in an absorbing state. For a path, the path probability and the
probability of being in a specific state at time τ can be computed. However, computation
of the latter requires the computation of convolutions of the distributions Ti along the path,
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which is cumbersome for longer paths.
The second approach is to substitute attack step timing distributions by geometric distri-
butions with the same mean. Define 0 < ∆ ≤ mins∈X(Tβ(s)(s)/(1 − P(s, s))) as the basic
time step of the new discrete-time Markov chain. Then, a new transition matrix P is defined
as
(1−P(s, s)) = (1−P(s, s)) ∆
Tβ(s)(s)
,
which implies 0 ≤ P(s, s) < 1. Then define
P(s, s′) = P(s, s′)
∆
Tβ(s)(s)
for s 6= s′,
which implies
∑
s′∈X
P(s, s′) =
∑
s′∈X\{s}
P(s, s′) + P(s, s)
= 1− (1−P(s, s)) ∆
Tβ(s)(s)
+ (1−P(s, s)) ∆
Tβ(s)(s)
= 1.
DTMC analysis can be performed using matrix P, in which every step has a duration of ∆
such that the distribution of the DTMC at discrete time points k ·∆ can be computed.
Similarly, one can use continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) for analysis. In that case,
each sojourn time is replaced by an exponential distribution with rate µs = (E[Tβ(s)(s)])
−1.
The resulting model is a CTMC on the same state space X, and standard CTMC analysis
can be applied.
The approach may be extended through the representation of each sojourn time Tβ(s)(s)
as a PH distribution. E.g., fitting the first two moments results in a PH distribution with
2 phases, if the coefficient of variation is not too small. In that case, the state space of the
CTMC is enlarged, since the phase of the distribution has to be considered in addition to
the state from X. If each sojourn time is replaced with a PH distribution with 2 phases, the
size of the state space doubles. Extended CTMC analysis can then use standard techniques
for the transient analysis of CTMCs.
The final analysis method is simulation, which can easily be performed using matrix P
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and Tβ(s)(s) for all s ∈ X. This method has been discussed in detail in Section 5.2.2. This
method is more efficient than traditional simulation since the values for β(s) are available,
and do not need to be recomputed during.
5.4 Other Analyses
Other types of analysis may be possible if the attack execution graph conforms to certain
assumptions. In this section, we highlight some of the analysis techniques used in the related
work that are applicable to an attack execution graph. The solution methods presented up
to this point are general and apply to any attack execution graph and adversary profile
combination.
5.4.1 Exponential Time
If the AEG is exponential in time, then the mean effort to failure (METF) method discussed
in [4] is applicable. Since calculating the METF requires analyzing the underlying Markov
chain, the steps to explore the reachable state-space and generate the transition matrix must
be completed.
Once the transition probability matrix is available, metrics such as mean up time, mean
down time, mean cycle time, mean time to first failure, and mean time to failure are easily
computable using the techniques in [14].
5.4.2 Attack Step Interchangeability
In exploring the related work, we recognized that the assumption of monotonicity was often
made during analysis. The monotonic property is not invoked in order to minimize the
size of the graph by eliminating loops or by minimizing the reachable state-space. Rather,
it ensures that the order of the attack steps does not affect the analysis. So long as the
ordering of attack steps is relevant, the analysis remains exponential in complexity.
In order for the two attack steps shown in Figure 5.1, a1 and a2, to be interchangeable,
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s0
s1
s2
s¢1
a1
a2
a2
a1
Figure 5.1: The Interchangeability of Attack Steps
they must conform to the following two requirements, which depend on the assumption that
both attack steps are enabled from some starting state s0. That is, B1(s0) = True and
B2(s0) = True. The following conditions must hold regardless of that initial state.
Then, each attack step must remain enabled regardless of the outcome of the other attack
step.
B2(E1(s0, o1)) = True ∀o1 ∈ Oa1
B1(E2(s0, o2)) = True ∀o2 ∈ Oa2
(5.1)
And finally, the resulting state must be the same regardless of the ordering of the attack
steps for all possible outcome combinations.
E2(E1(s0, o1), o2) = E1(E2(s0, o2), o1)
∀o1 ∈ Oa1 ∀o2 ∈ Oa2
(5.2)
Equation 5.1 implies that the AEG must be static with respect to state transitions. If the
AEG is not static w.r.t. transitions, then Eq. 5.1 does not hold for all initial states s0.
If an AEG is static w.r.t. transitions and has monotonic enabling conditions and out-
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comes, then both Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are satisfied. This means that once an attack step
is enabled, regardless of the additions to the state, the attack step remains enabled. Addi-
tionally, the outcomes of attack steps only add to the state. Together, these imply that once
an attack step is enabled, it is always enabled.
The same holds if simple outcomes are substituted for monotonic outcomes, and if simple
enabling conditions are substituted for monotonic enabling conditions since the “simple”
properties imply the corresponding monotonic properties.
Once the interchangeability of attack steps is ensured, we may apply the reachability al-
gorithms from [8] and [15] to the AEG. While these algorithms only identify if a goal is
reachable from the starting state, they may be augmented to use additional AEG informa-
tion. For instance, one may analyze the cost to a goal. However, the aggregation function,
in this case the sum of the costs, must also be proven to be independent of attack step
ordering.
5.5 Example Metrics
In this section, we present example metrics for two models; a DMZ and a non-DMZ model.
In order to validate our method, we compare these metrics to the metrics presented for the
same models in [1]. We also present new metrics to provide further insight.
Each of these models represents a SCADA network. The two models demonstrate the
effects of using a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between networks. One model allows direct
communication between the corporate and control networks (non-DMZ), and the other sep-
arates the two with a DMZ. The non-DMZ model contains 19 state variables, while the DMZ
model contains 20 state variables. Note that the adversaries we define for analysis typically
have a look-ahead of 3 or 4 steps. The models and adversaries are fully documented in
Appendix A.1.
First, we consider the time that the adversary takes to reach a goal. This is the metric
that was reported in [1] using simulation. Table 5.1 contains the resulting metric mean and
95% confidence interval range from a simulation over 500 runs as well as the result of the
numerical analysis. Note that the simulation results are imprecise when compared to the
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results from numerical analysis. The precision and the short computation time are significant
advantages of the numerical analysis. Performance comparisons are presented in Section 5.6.
Table 5.1: Time to Goal (in minutes)
Simulation Numerical
Adversary Non-DMZ DMZ Non-DMZ DMZ
Nation State 116.3 ± 3.58 209.8 ± 5.2 114.3 209.3
Lone Hacker 116.3 ± 3.58 - 114.3 -
Terrorist Org 348.9 ± 13.8 353.1 ± 20.1 370. 370.
Employee 15.04 ± 0.48 - 15.3 -
Sys Admin 15.72 ± 0.76 15.2 ± 1.5 15.29 15.29
Next, we present two new metrics: the probability of detecting an attack, and the fre-
quency of specific attacks within a sequence of attacks. The frequency of an attack step is
explored in [2], but not in [1]. In order to enable calculation of the frequency of an attack
step during simulation, a reward event must be fired each time an attack step is selected.
If we had comparison values, we would likely see the same imprecision in the results from
simulation as we did for the “time to goal” metric. It would be due simply to the limitations
of simulation as a solution method.
Table 5.2: Frequency of Attack Steps
Adversary Non-DMZ DMZ
Nation State
Hack User Acct. 87.5% Hack User Acct. 57.3%
Access Data 12.5% Hack Data Server 35.8%
Access Data 6.8%
Lone Hacker
Hack User Acct. 87.5% Do Nothing 100%
Access Data 12.5%
Terrorist Org
Hack User Acct. 32.4% Hack User Acct. 32.4%
Elevate Privilege 13.5% Elevate Privilege 13.5%
Hack Ctrl. Server 54.0% Hack Ctrl. Server 54.0%
Employee
User Login 6.5% Do Nothing 100%
Access Data 93.5%
Sys Admin
Admin Login 6.5% Admin Login 6.5%
Access Data 93.5% Access Data 93.5%
Table 5.2 reports the percentage of time spent attempting specific attack steps. Here,
it is once again notable that adding the DMZ to the system deters both the Lone Hacker
and the Employee adversaries from attempting any attack whatsoever. Also, the Nation
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State adversary clearly changes its route to the goal. In addition to tracing the paths of
adversaries through the system, the frequency of attack steps is also useful for determining
the effects of deterrent mechanisms on the time an adversary spends on a given attack.
Table 5.3: Probability of Detection
Adversary Non-DMZ DMZ
Nation State 0.0784516 0.220143
Lone Hacker 0.0784516 -
Terrorist Org 0.478188 0.478188
Employee 0.0241125 -
Sys Admin 0.0241125 0.0635423
Finally, we present the probability of detection in Table 5.3. This metric is simple to
compute using numerical analysis; to produce it via simulation, however, modification of the
main simulation loop would be required. We note that the Terrorist Organization attacker
is much more likely to be detected than any other attacker. Furthermore, by adding the
demilitarized zone to the network, we triple the probability of detecting the Nation State
and System Administrator adversaries.
5.6 Performance Comparison
While the types of numerical analysis we demonstrate can significantly reduce the analysis
runtime when compared to the simulation approach used in [1] and [2], they require full
exploration of the reachable state space. In this section, we present timing measurements to
assess the scalability of the state-space generation algorithm and the attack step selection
algorithm.
First, we present an example model that scales easily in both the state space and the
reachable state space. The attack execution graph for this “gatekeeper model” is shown in
Figure 5.2. The AEG consists of a single initial state variable that enables the entire row of
attack steps. The successful outcome for each attack step captures the corresponding state
variable in the row below. One final attack step is enabled by possessing any of the state
variables in the state variable row, and a successful outcome results in achieving the goal.
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The gatekeeper model is fully documented in Appendix A.2.
SV
Attack Attack Attack
SV SV SV
Attack
Goal
Figure 5.2: Gatekeeper Model
We took timing measurements while varying two factors in the model. One was the number
of attack step and state variable node pairs in the center rows of the AEG. One node pair is
circled in the figure for clarity. The other factor was the look-ahead of the adversary in the
adversary profile. The size of the state-space is 2(N+2), where N is the number of nodes in
the AEG. More importantly, the complexity of the determine beta function is on the order
of O((2N)L), where L represents the look-ahead. For each configuration, we measured the
overall time spent to generate the state space. The results are shown in Table 5.4.
The time to generate the state space followed the general exponential formula expressed
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Table 5.4: State-Space Generation Timing (in seconds)
Look-ahead 5 Nodes 10 Nodes 20 Nodes 40 Nodes
3 0.002 0.036 0.513 15.16
4 0.022 0.577 16.128 1003
5 0.174 8.885 569.98 -
6 1.336 149.20 - -
7 10.131 - - -
earlier in the paper. The time increased significantly as the look-ahead and the number
of available attack steps increased. Some configurations took too long to compute within
reasonable bounds.
However, those results were generated from a model in which the reachable state space
was almost as large as the overall state space. In typical models, that would not be the
case. There is an inherent ordering to attack steps that prevents the reachable state space
from being anywhere near the size of the full state space. In order to demonstrate that, we
repeated the timing experiments on the two models used in Section 5.5 and in [1].
Table 5.5: Simulation and Numerical Solution Timing (in seconds)
Simulation Numerical
Adversary Non-DMZ DMZ Non-DMZ DMZ
Nation State 121.94 74.99 0.009 0.004
Lone Hacker 123.17 5.94 0.008 0.001
Terrorist Org 40.63 18.90 0.017 0.005
Employee 6.58 5.09 0.002 0.001
Sys Admin 75.10 55.65 0.021 0.010
Table 5.5 contains timing measurements for both simulation and state-space generation
of the two typical models. The numerical solution techniques significantly outperform the
simulations. That is primarily due to the optimization of computing determine beta by
using a graph-based approach.
In comparison to the state-space generation times of our Gatekeeper model, real-world
models with the same number of state variables take considerably less time to complete.
First, we note that the size of the reachable state space is very small compared to the
size of the full state space. Also, although the DMZ model has one more state variable,
its reachable state space is smaller than that of the non-DMZ model. It shows that the
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structure of the model has a significant impact on the timing. And, most importantly, the
state-space generation completes quickly for typical models.
Simulation was the only method available to solve ADVISE models. In this chapter, we
improved the performance of the simulator by introducing a caching technique. We also
introduced new solution methods that require state space and transition probability matrix
generation. Those solution methods enable new quantitative security metrics, such as the
mean cost to achieve a goal. The state space and transition probability matrix generation
complete quickly, and solving for metrics using this approach is faster than the origional
simulation method. ADVISE models can be quickly analyzed using a variety of techniques.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
We have extended the ADVISE method by generalizing the adversary decision algorithm,
introducing new solution methods, and improving performance.
By generalizing the adversary decision algorithm, we remove the assumptions previously
placed on system adversaries. More complex adversaries may be modeled since there are
no restrictions placed on the adversary’s utility functions. This enables adversary decisions
based on thresholds such as budgets, time-dependent valuations, and any other arbitrary
function.
The solution methods we introduce enable ADVISE to produce insightful metrics. Simula-
tion is inherently a transient analysis. We have enabled the computation of both steady-state
and transient metrics by generating the state-space and transition probability matrix. We
also introduce alternative analyses that may be enabled if the model satisfies specific as-
sumptions.
Finally, performance optimizations to the adversary decision algorithm and the simulation
algorithm allow ADVISE to produce accurate metrics quickly and efficiently. We achieve
this by adapting the adversary decision to use a graph-based rather than a tree-based algo-
rithm. We also improve simulation by caching the adversary’s decision over the course of
the simulation.
These extensions to ADVISE allow extensive modeling of system security and adversary
preferences, and enable the accelerated computation of relevant quantitative security metrics.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL DOCUMENTATION
A.1 SCADA Network Models
There are two SCADA network models, the Non-DMZ model and the DMZ model. There
are only slight differences between the models, and therefore they are documented together.
Table A.1 documents the state-variables in both models. Any state-variable without ad-
ditional marking is included in both models, while a state-variable with an asterisk(*) is
unique to the Non-DMZ model and a state-variable with a dagger(†) is unique to the DMZ
model. The adversary profile is documented in Table A.2. The AP is common to both
models. Finally, the attack steps are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4. Table A.3 contains
all of the attack steps which are common to both models, while Table A.4 documents the
model-unique attack steps using the same labels as above.
A.2 Gatekeeper Model
The gatekeeper model depends on two variables: the look-ahead N and the number of attack
step-access nodes M. Table A.5 documents the gatekeeper model.
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